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Abstract 
We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different 
classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We 
present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces bank 
earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and 
independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate 
earnings and becomes larger during crises, when the incentive to conceal capital shortfalls is 
stronger. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving 
the quality of information disclosure.   
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 I. Introduction 
The opacity of bank balance sheets impedes market discipline by limiting outsiders’ 
ability to accurately assess banks’ value and risk. Information asymmetries arising from opacity 
can undermine banks’ ability to raise capital, dry up interbank markets, and fuel contagion, thus 
increasing systemic risk. Policymakers therefore aim to mitigate bank opacity by requiring 
increased disclosure and restricting asset composition.  
In this paper, we test whether changes in the priority structure of debt claims that alter 
different creditors’ monitoring incentives affect bank opacity. We focus on earnings opacity 
because financial reporting systems are important tools to reveal asymmetric information to 
outsiders (Huizinga and Laeven (2012)) and meet outsiders’ expectations to avoid interventions 
(Acharya and Lambrecht (2015)).
1  
We exploit the staggered introduction of depositor preference laws in 15 U.S. states to 
estimate the causal effect of debtholder monitoring incentives on bank earnings opacity. Our 
setting is useful from an econometric perspective. These laws are plausibly exogenous to 
earnings opacity as their primary objective is to safeguard deposits, and they also only affect 
state-chartered banks (the treatment group) but not nationally-chartered banks in the same state 
(the control group). These laws do not affect insured depositors’ position in the claim structure, 
but they make uninsured deposits senior to nondeposits.
2
 Nondepositors, who are typically better 
monitors than depositors (King (2004)), therefore face greater losses in the event of bankruptcy, 
and are incentivised to exert stronger monitoring to reduce the likelihood of losing their claim.  
                                           
1  Chemmanur et al. (2009) argue that conveying information to outsiders helps reduce information asymmetries, and Bushman 
and Williams (2012) emphasize that outsiders’ ability to exert discipline depends on accounting information, which is crucial 
for monitoring. Accounting rules that affect availability, timeliness, consistency, and reliability of information about 
performance and risk matter for the volatility and cyclicality of earnings. Bushman (2016) also stresses that discretionary 
provisioning affects accounting numbers as an input into regulatory calculations, thus limiting outside monitoring. 
2  Nondepositors are suppliers of Fed funds; providers of other borrowed money; unsecured lenders; holders of debentures; 
beneficiaries of guarantees; holders of bankers’ acceptances; and holders of subordinated debt claims. Nondeposit claims also 
include general creditor claims, e.g., trade creditors, landlords, and suppliers. 
3 
 
 
Two studies provide a theoretical underpinning for our research. First, Birchler (2000) 
predicts that depositor preference leads to more efficient monitoring by assigning greater 
monitoring incentives to nondepositors. Second, Cordella et al. (2018) posit that bailout 
guarantees decrease the sensitivity of debt pricing to risk. Since depositor preference laws are 
akin to a guarantee for deposits, they decrease the risk sensitivity of uninsured depositors, but 
increase nondepositors’ losses in a liquidation, leading to higher price sensitivity to bank risk. For 
this reason, nondepositors are likely to demand greater transparency. To the extent that the 
increase in nondepositors’ monitoring is greater than the decrease in uninsured depositors’ 
monitoring, depositor preference laws should result in reduced earnings opacity.  
Our key result is that incentivizing nondepositor monitoring significantly reduces 
earnings opacity. A detailed analysis highlights that the reductions in earnings opacity are driven 
by reductions in earnings overstatements. The economic magnitude is equivalent to an 8.4 
percent reduction of understatements of loan loss provisions.
3
   
This research matters for two reasons. First, bank regulators are concerned about opacity. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) document that opacity exacerbates the procyclicality of lending, and 
Huizinga and Laeven (2012) report that banks use discretionary accounting to overstate the value 
of distressed assets and regulatory capital during crises to conceal problems. Second, our work is 
timely and policy-relevant because bailouts, blanket guarantees, and other forms of support 
during the recent crisis weakened the monitoring incentives of bank creditors (Berger and Turk-
Ariss (2015)). Our findings highlight the beneficial effects of the introduction of depositor 
                                           
3  This figure is based on Column (2) in Panel B of Table 4 and is computed as exp.(-0.8741)-1 = -0.084. 
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priority laws in the European Union that call for more monitoring by sophisticated creditors and 
require junior debtholders to contribute to bank resolutions, resulting in greater transparency.
4
  
We use difference-in-difference estimation to compare earnings opacity within state-
chartered banks to that of nationally-chartered banks in the same state-quarter, thereby 
controlling for local economic conditions. To bias our estimates, variation in omitted variables 
must coincide with the law changes and differentially affect nationally-chartered and state-
chartered banks. Our data contain 15 separate enactments of depositor preference laws which 
reduces the likelihood that such variables confound the results. We also conduct tests to mitigate 
concerns that banking crises in New England and Texas, the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis, 
regulatory responses to these crises (i.e., the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA)), or the deregulation of banking markets and the subsequent wave of mergers and 
acquisitions affect our findings. We also show that using an alternative control group based on a 
matching strategy leaves our inferences intact.  
We employ measures of earnings opacity that are widely used in the finance, accounting, 
and banking literature (Yu (2008); Hutton et al. (2009); Cornett et al. (2009); Beatty and Liao 
(2014); Jiang et al. (2016); Chen et al. (2018)). In our main tests, these measures are the natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of residuals from regressions of loan loss provisions on drivers of 
changes in these loan loss provisions. Larger absolute values of these residuals indicate greater 
earnings opacity. In additional tests, we use signed measures to capture whether discretionary 
provisioning is used to increase or decrease earnings, because managers have incentives to 
overstate earnings (Huizinga and Laeven (2012); Norden and Stoian (2014); Jiang et al. (2016)). 
                                           
4  The view about the adverse consequences of opacity contrasts with Chen and Hasan (2006) and Gorton (2013) who argue that 
greater transparency can trigger bank runs. Similarly, Dang et al. (2017) stress that opacity minimizes information leakages.  
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Further tests use measures that are based on the idea that outsiders find it difficult to value the 
real estate owned by a bank, which is considered to reflect opacity (Flannery et al. (2013). We 
also calculate the sum of opaque assets consisting of bank premises, fixed assets, investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, intangible assets, and the balance sheet category “other assets”. 
Flannery et al. (2013) stress that investors find it difficult to value such other assets.  
Beyond contributing to the literature on debtholder monitoring, this study is also related 
to three other strands of literature. Our work is related to research on how legislation affects 
transparency in financial markets and banking. Benos et al. (forthcoming) show that introducing a 
centralized trading requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act increased competition and reduced 
opacity in the market for interest rate swaps, and Jiang et al. (2016) examine how deregulating 
state banking markets affects bank opacity. They find that greater competition increases the 
quality of banks’ information disclosure which enhances markets’ ability to exert discipline. In 
contrast to these studies, we focus on how changes in monitoring incentives that apply to one 
important group of creditors and differentially affect state-chartered and nationally-chartered 
banks influence bank opacity. In addition, our use of state-quarter-fixed effects also allows 
disentangling the effects of banking deregulation from the effects of depositor preference law 
enactment on bank opacity.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on banks’ earnings management. Wahlen (1994) 
shows that banks exercise discretion to reduce regulatory costs and increase loan loss provisions 
when cash flows increase. Cohen et al. (2014) report that earnings management exacerbates tail 
risk during crises, and Bushman and Williams (2015) show that more opaque banks have higher 
financing costs, engage in more risk shifting, and suffer more from illiquidity during recessions. 
Our work contributes to this literature by highlighting that legislation can mitigate bank opacity.  
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Third, we advance the literature on debt priority laws in banking. Hirschhorn and Zervos 
(1990) and Thomson (1994) propose that nondepositors collateralize claims and shorten the 
maturity of their claims in response to depositor preference laws to protect themselves. Osterberg 
(1996) and Osterberg and Thomson (1999; 2003) model the role of depositor preference for the 
cost of failure, failure rates, resolution types, and the cost of debt. Pages and Santos (2003) focus 
on the interaction of monitoring incentives of debtholders and regulators when depositors have a 
priority claim. They argue that regulatory monitoring depends on debtholder monitoring. Our 
work differs from these studies by showing that reallocating monitoring incentives to junior 
debtholders triggers reductions in earnings opacity.  
Recent work by Danisewicz et al. (2018a) shows that priority for deposits increases 
nondeposit costs and reduces bank risk.
5
 In contrast to their work, we document a direct response 
of banks’ accounting choices to changes in nondepositors’ monitoring incentives. This is 
illustrated by tests that show that banks limit discretionary provisioning more if they are more 
reliant on nondeposit funding. We also find that banks that use more Fed funds reduce earnings 
opacity more than those that are less reliant on this type of funding, consistent with Fed funds 
providers’ superior monitoring abilities. Our results therefore highlight a mechanism by which 
greater nondepositor monitoring incentives result in more effective influencing of bank behavior.  
Unlike Danisewicz et al. (2018a), we also examine responses by nondepositors to the 
subordination of their claims that may undermine monitoring incentives such as nondepositors’ 
propensity to collateralize claims and reduce their maturity. Such actions, albeit present in the 
data, do not interfere with the disciplining effect for earnings opacity. To avoid misattributing the 
reductions in opacity to nondepositor monitoring rather than regulatory monitoring, we also 
                                           
5  The higher risk of losing the claim triggers greater nondepositor monitoring. This results in higher monitoring costs that 
nondepositors pass on to the banks by demanding higher interest rates. 
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control for regulatory monitoring. Moreover, we show that depositor preference laws affect bank 
behavior heterogeneously in the cross section and over time. Large banks, banks with greater 
exposure to real estate assets, and unsound banks respond more strongly to depositor preference 
laws. Further tests highlight that the effects of depositor preference are more pronounced in listed 
banks than in unlisted banks, and they are also stronger for independent banks than for banks that 
are members of a bank holding company. Finally, we find that the adjustments in earnings 
opacity are greater during crisis episodes.  
We proceed as follows. Section II reports on the history of depositor preference laws and 
Section III develops our hypothesis. Section IV describes the identification strategy. Section V 
presents the main results. Section VI explores the factors that mitigate and amplify the 
responsiveness of bank opacity to the reallocation of monitoring incentives. Section VII shows 
sensitivity tests, and Section VIII concludes.  
II. Institutional details 
Figure 1 shows that thirty states enacted depositor preference between 1909 and 1993. 
These laws leave the debt priority order within nationally-chartered banks unaffected but change 
it for state-chartered banks. Table 1 shows that in the absence of these laws, the claim structure 
follows that specified in the Banking Act of 1935 assigning equal rank to the claims of uninsured 
depositors and nondepositors. With depositor preference, claims of insured and uninsured 
depositors are equal, elevating uninsured depositors’ claims above those of nondepositors, 
assigning nondepositors a junior claim in the event of bankruptcy.  
 [FIGURE 1]   [TABLE 1]     
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Figure 1 highlights that implementation of depositor preference law occurred at different 
times across states. There are two reasons behind the introduction of the law.
6
 First, the laws fix 
omissions in prior legislation. Kansas introduced depositor preference law because there were no 
state guidelines for the liquidation of claims. Likewise, Texas and California amended their laws 
claiming that state law had not contained priority rules for payments to creditors during bank 
liquidation. A key benefit of priority rules, formalized in a model by Hardy (2013), is to reduce 
bankruptcy costs because priority rules can avoid costly litigation by creditors to establish the 
size and priority of their claim via courts.
7
  
Second, protecting depositors during liquidation provoked the introduction of depositor 
preference laws. Missouri banking regulations contain multiple references to policy efforts to 
protect depositors, one of them being the priority claim for depositors in a liquidation. Similarly, 
the records of the state bank commissioner in Kansas stress safeguarding deposits as a primary 
objective. In Rhode Island, priority was assigned to depositors to protect their claims in a failure. 
The legislative councils’ digests stress that the changes allow swifter reorganization and 
dissolution of state-chartered banks, as in California. However, in several states no reason is 
given for the amendments in the priority structure. The keyword search of news sources does not 
suggest much interest by the media in state depositor preference, consistent with the view that 
                                           
6  Danisewicz et al. (2018a) show that economic and political considerations do not coincide with the introduction of depositor 
preference. Banks in Florida, Hawaii, and Minnesota performed well during the adoption of the laws, but banking difficulties 
arose in Texas, California, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. They perform keyword searches in media 
sources and review assembly laws from the state legislative councils’ archives, digests, and the concurrencies of the state 
amendments to understand the reasons for the adoption of state depositor preference laws. We improve on this search strategy 
and use additional keyword searches in Business Source Complete, described in Section A.1 of the Online Appendix. We 
also randomly sample failed state-chartered banks in states with depositor preference law by performing additional media 
searches. Where possible, we also cross checked this information with the “FDIC’s History of the 80s – Lessons for the 
Future”, a resource describing the banking problems in the 1980s. See https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/.   
7  Creditors often seek settlement of claims in a bank liquidation via courts (e.g. Harvard Law Review (1991), Hardy (2013)).  
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these laws fix omissions in prior legislation.
8
 There is also no evidence that the laws were 
implemented due to concerns about bank opacity or earnings management. 
The differential treatment of depositors was abandoned in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act on August 10, 1993. This law introduced national depositor preference and 
assigned priority to deposit claims on state-chartered banks in states that did not previously adopt 
depositor preference. Depositor claims on nationally-chartered banks also gained priority. 
National depositor preference law was introduced to save money in the federal budget (Thomson 
(1994), Marino and Bennett (1999)).  
III. Hypothesis development  
The claims of uninsured depositors and nondepositors receive their pro rata share of the 
net value of assets that are liquidated because they have equal priority in the absence of depositor 
preference.  Uninsured depositors and nondepositors may consequently incur losses (Marino and 
Bennett (1999)). Elevating uninsured depositor claims above those of nondepositors via depositor 
preference asymmetrically affects these claimants’ monitoring incentives. With depositor 
preference, nondepositors face a higher probability of losses in case of liquidation. Therefore, 
they have greater incentives to monitor and are likely to demand greater transparency. In contrast, 
the monitoring incentives of uninsured depositors are reduced (Birchler (2000)). 
In theory, reallocating monitoring incentives from uninsured depositors to nondepositors 
via depositor preference could result in either stronger or weaker monitoring in the aggregate, 
with corresponding effects for banks’ earnings management and information disclosure. It is also 
plausible that the effects of more monitoring by nondepositors and less monitoring by uninsured 
depositors cancel out, so that depositor preference laws have no effect on bank opacity.  
                                           
8  Although news items that discuss resolutions of state-chartered banks in Kansas (e.g., Cedar Vale State Bank) and Texas (e.g., 
First City Bancorporation of Texas) mention that the FDIC assigned priority claims to depositors, neither these news items 
nor the FDIC’s History of the 80s contain information about the motivation for state depositor preference laws.  
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Banks’ liability structure sheds some light on these issues. Uninsured deposits and 
nondeposits account for 8 percent and 5 percent of total liabilities, respectively. That is, the 
monitoring incentives of relatively inefficient monitors (uninsured depositors) are reallocated to a 
somewhat smaller proportion of efficient monitors (nondepositors) via the laws. Moreover, 
depositors are typically individuals who cannot influence bank behavior nor are concerned about 
opacity whereas nondepositors comprise institutional investors such as other banks that can 
influence bank conduct. These characteristics of the data are suggestive of an increase in overall 
monitoring.  
We therefore hypothesize that the greater nondepositor monitoring incentives motivate 
banks to limit discretionary provisioning to reduce opacity. This improves safety and soundness 
by reducing information asymmetries (Acharya and Ryan (2016)). 
The more opaque a bank, the more effort nondepositors expend collecting information 
about its condition. This monitoring activity imposes private costs on nondepositors. The extent 
of these costs is a function of depositor preference law. For a given level of opacity, 
nondepositors conduct more monitoring and therefore incur higher private costs following 
subordination of their claims. To avoid that nondepositors pass on their greater monitoring costs 
through higher cost of capital, banks may respond to the shift in monitoring incentives toward 
nondepositors by releasing more information (Easley and O’Hara (2004); Yu (2008)). This idea 
is also reflected in related findings by Irani and Oesch (2013, 2016). They show that outside 
monitoring decreases accrual manipulation and increases financial reporting quality. Therefore, 
depositor preference laws are likely to induce banks to reduce earnings opacity because 
nondepositors’ monitoring imposes costs on banks that can be alleviated by lowering opacity. 
11 
 
 
This argument is also reinforced by Cordella et al. (2018). They posit that the pricing of 
debt instruments relies on costly information disclosure, and highlight that banks have greater 
incentives to disseminate information when debtholders are not protected by government 
guarantees which decrease the sensitivity of debt pricing to risk. Debtholders that are likely to 
lose their claim, either because their claim is junior in nature (as is the case for uncollateralized 
debt) or during a bail in, are likely to penalize opaque banks by requiring a greater return. 
Provided that the effect of depositor preference is larger for nondepositors’ monitoring incentives 
than for uninsured depositors’, greater monitoring incentives will motivate nondepositors to 
demand more transparency. This should reduce earnings opacity, reflected in less discretionary 
accounting choices for state-chartered banks.
9
  
We state our hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis:  The increase in debtholder monitoring incentives from depositor 
preference laws decreases earnings opacity for state-chartered banks, 
relative to nationally-chartered banks. 
IV. Data description, variable definitions, and identification strategy 
We construct a quarterly bank level data set for commercial and savings banks obtained 
from the Quarterly Report on Condition and Income (Call Report) from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago. Our sample covers the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2 and includes banks from 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Texas, the fifteen states 
that enacted depositor preference during this time.
10,11
 
                                           
9  This prediction is reinforced by the fact that nondepositor claims include Fed funds, which are crucial to most banks’ funding 
mix. It is vital for banks to maintain access to these funds and allow debtholder monitoring. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show 
that large debtholders strongly influence borrower behavior since they lend at short maturities, requiring frequent 
renegotiation. Consistent with this, Holod and Peek (2007) find that opacity limits banks’ ability to raise funds. 
10  On March 31, 1983, all insured commercial banks started reporting Call reports on a quarterly basis.  
12 
 
 
We choose this timeframe because banks were not required to submit quarterly Call 
Reports before 1983 and because all banks, irrespective of their charter, were subject to national 
depositor preference from 1993Q3 as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. 
Following Osterberg (1996), we exclude banks in New York State, due to their size and 
regulatory environment. Only institutions that operate at least four quarters before and after the 
introduction of state depositor preference are included, ensuring that a sufficient number of 
observations is available for each bank.
12
   
These selection criteria yield a final sample of 205,057 bank quarter observations for 
5,524 banks. These banks account for 67 percent of total banking assets in the U.S. The state-
chartered banks hold 39 percent of total bank assets in these states. 
Call Reports provide information on banks’ charters (state or national), location, size, 
equity capital to total assets, total loans, loan portfolio composition, loan loss provisions, return 
on assets, liability structure, and the regulatory agency. We approximate collateralization with the 
sum of the ratio of pledged securities, Federal fund repos, standby letters of credit, and secured 
pledged deposits to total nondeposit liabilities. We capture nondeposit maturity structure with the 
ratio of nondeposits with a maturity of one year or less to total nondeposits. We combine this 
information with the Case Shiller Index and data on the state level per capita income and 
unemployment rates from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
Finally, we obtain information about regulatory monitoring and bank soundness. We 
collect annual information about the distance in miles between the bank’s headquarters and the 
nearest field office of the corresponding regulator (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
                                                                                                                                        
11  Utah introduced depositor preference on January 1, 1983 while Virginia introduced depositor preference on July 1, 1983. 
Before 1983 banks reported Call Report information on a less frequent basis. We require four quarters of pre-treatment data 
to test the parallel trends assumption. As no pre-treatment data is available for Utah, and only two quarters of pre-treatment 
data are available for Virginia, we exclude observations of banks from both states from the sample. In unreported tests that 
include observations from both states, our inferences are robust.  
12  Including New York banks or banks that do not satisfy the four-quarter sample screen leaves our results unaffected. 
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Federal Reserve, FDIC, state regulator) to allow for time variation in this variable. Distance is a 
good proxy for regulatory monitoring because on site examinations enable regulators to verify the 
accuracy of the information submitted by banks (Berger et al. (2016)) and budget constraints lead 
regulators to monitor more intensively firms that are geographically closer to regulatory field 
offices (Kedia and Rajgopal (2011)).  
 
A. Measuring bank opacity  
Our main tests use opacity measures that reflect discretion in loan loss provisioning. 
Loan loss provisions are the most important bank accrual and are informative about estimated 
losses on opaque assets. To do so, we regress loan loss provisions on a set of independent 
variables. The residuals are interpreted as an indicator of the abnormal accrual of loan loss 
provisions, one of the most common ways banks manipulate earnings and regulatory capital. 
Higher values are interpreted as evidence of greater earnings management and greater earnings 
opacity.  
Following prior work (Wahlen (1994); Yu (2008); Cornett et al. (2009); Hutton et al. 
(2009); Jiang et al. (2016)), our tests rely on the absolute value of the residuals; that is, we use an 
unsigned measure of earnings opacity. Absolute values of the residuals reflect both negative and 
positive residuals, allowing us to capture income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management (Jiang et al. (2016)). This avoids that such actions offset each other and lead to low 
power in our tests. Since the residuals are not normally distributed, we perform a logarithmic 
transformation. We also use signed earnings opacity measures to investigate whether banks use 
discretionary provisioning to increase or decrease earnings (Norden and Stoian (2014)).  
14 
 
 
Beatty and Liao (2014) review and identify different models to measure discretionary 
provisions. We follow their four main specifications and estimate  
(1) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−2 
+𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑠𝑡 
+ 𝛼9∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡 is the ratio of loan loss provisions to lagged total loans in bank b in state s 
in quarter t. ∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 is the change in nonperforming assets divided by lagged total loans to 
capture changes in risk taking and risk culture. As in Jiang et al. (2016), we include lags and 
leads of ∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 to capture historical changes in NPA and current and forward looking 
information on NPA, when banks choose the current level of 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡; this approach also controls 
for changes in accounting preferences over time. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of total 
assets in the previous quarter. It reflects differences in the level of monitoring by regulators and 
private sector stakeholders of banks of different size. This variable is not normally distributed, 
and so we take the log. ∆𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑏𝑠𝑡 is the change in total loans to lagged total loans. ∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡 (the 
change in state Gross State Product), 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑠𝑡 (the state Case-Shiller Index), and ∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 
(the change in the state unemployment rate) capture the effects of time-varying macroeconomic 
state-specific conditions that affect 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡.  
We estimate equation (1) using OLS. We then calculate 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡, the abnormal component of 
loan loss provisions, which proxies for discretionary changes in loan loss provisions and 
indicates earnings opacity. We take the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the residuals, 
denoted as 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
1 . 
We also estimate the remaining three models of Beatty and Liao (2014) to construct 
𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
2 , 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
3 , and 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
4  based on the following three equations, respectively. 
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(2) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−2 
+𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 
+𝛼9∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 denotes the ratio of loan loss allowances to total loans. The next 
regression includes the additional control variable 𝐶𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡, net charge offs divided by lagged total 
loans. We estimate  
(3) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−2 
+𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 
+𝛼9∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐶𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡. 
Our fourth model simultaneously controls for both loan loss allowances and net charge 
offs. We estimate 
(4) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−2 
+𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 
+𝛼9∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐴𝐿𝑊𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼11𝐶𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡. 
We include past allowances because current provisions may be lower if banks have 
recognized high provisions in the past.
13
  
Using equations (1)–(4) we also calculate signed earnings opacity variables, i.e., we use 
the values of the residuals but do not take their absolute values. We denote the positive signed 
measures as 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
1+ , 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
2+ , 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
3+ , and 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
4+ , and the negative signed variables as 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
1− , 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
2− , 
𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
3− , and 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
4− .
 
 
                                           
13  Previous evidence reported by Beatty and Liao (2014) shows that these measures of opacity correlate intuitively with SEC 
earnings restatements, suggesting that these measures based on discretionary loan loss provisioning capture opacity. In 
unreported tests, we correlate the opacity measures we calculate in this research with SEC earnings restatements and also 
with bid-ask spreads as used in Flannery et al. (2004, 2013) during our sample period, and find positively significant 
correlations. This indicates the earnings-based measures are valid measures of opacity.  
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To rule out measurement problems, we use one alternative measure for earnings opacity 
based on Bushman and Williams (2012), which also considers bank profit as an explanatory 
variable. We denote this variable EO
BW
  
(5) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝛼2∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼4∆𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡−2 
+𝛼5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛼6∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼7∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑠𝑡 
+𝛼9∆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑡−1 denotes the ratio of net earnings before loan loss provisions to lagged 
total loans.  
Moreover, we rely on two other measures of opacity. We calculate the ratio of other real 
estate owned relative to total loans (OREO). The idea behind this measure is that it is difficult for 
outsiders to value real estate owned by a bank. The higher this ratio, the more opaque is the bank 
(Flannery et al. (2013)). Further, we follow Flannery et al. (2013) and calculate opaque assets 
(OPAQUE) which is the sum of the book value of bank premises and fixed assets, investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, intangible assets (such as mortgage service rights and core deposit 
intangibles) and the category “other assets” (such as accounts receivable, repossessed autos, boats 
and other collateral). The intuition is that opacity is positively related to OPAQUE because 
investors find it difficult to value such assets. All three alternative measures of opacity are not 
normally distributed, and we therefore take the log. 
Table 2 defines the variables used in the analysis and presents summary statistics.  
[TABLE 2] 
B. Identification Strategy 
To tease out the causal effects of changes in debt priority structure on opacity, we employ 
difference-in-differences estimation. We estimate  
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(6) 𝑦𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐺𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐺𝑏𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜂𝑏𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝑦𝑏𝑠𝑡 is one of the opacity measures described above for bank b in state s at quarter 
t. 𝑇𝐺𝑏𝑠𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 for state-chartered banks (0 for nationally-chartered banks); 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if depositor preference is in force in state s at time t (0 
otherwise); 𝑋𝑏𝑠𝑡 is a vector containing the bank time-varying control variables size, capital ratio, 
the loss dummy, and the one quarter lagged loan loss provision. The latter variable controls for 
reversals of accruals over time (Kanagaretnam et al. (2010); Jiang et al. (2016)). Bank size, the 
capital ratio, and the lagged loan loss provision are not normally distributed and enter our 
estimations in logs. 𝛾𝑏 and 𝛾𝑠𝑡 are bank and state-quarter-fixed effects, respectively.
14
 The error 
term is 𝜂𝑏𝑠𝑡.
15
 Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Bank-fixed effects eliminate time-invariant bank-specific heterogeneity. The state-
quarter-fixed effects eliminate all time-varying state-specific confounding factors that 
simultaneously affect the treatment and control groups, such as demand-side effects. The state-
quarter-fixed effects ensure that the average treatment effect is estimated based on comparisons 
between the treatment and control group within the same state-quarter.   
There are two assumptions that must be satisfied to draw causal inferences when using 
difference-in-differences estimation (Roberts and Whited (2013)). First, the treatment must be 
exogenous with respect to the outcome of interest. Second, the control group must be a valid 
counterfactual for the treatment group. We now examine the validity of these assumptions. 
C. Plausible exogeneity of state depositor preference laws  
                                           
14  The post dummy is captured by state-quarter-fixed effects. It does not appear in the estimation equation.  
15  Banks’ charter choice could affect our analysis. Banks may try to avoid depositor preference by switching their charter to 
remain opaque. This concern is unlikely to matter because only 3.3 percent of banks change charter. We model in Table B.1 
of our Online Appendix the charter switch in Panel A as a function of the post dummy, bank characteristics, and the opacity 
measures. Neither the post dummy nor the opacity measures predict the charter choice. Panel B excludes banks that switch 
charters. Our inferences remain unaffected.  
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The absence of news items about bank opacity from the keyword searches in Section II 
suggests that the laws were not implemented due to concerns about opacity. To empirically 
support the view that opacity and other economic and institutional characteristics do not drive the 
adoption of state depositor preference laws, we model the adoption of the laws as a function of 
changes over time and across states in variables that capture such characteristics. We estimate the 
equation 
(7)    𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝐶 + 𝛾𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝐶 + 𝛿𝑊𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if depositor preference is in force in state s at time t 
and 0 otherwise. 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝐶 and 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝐶 denote the average level of earnings opacity 
(measured using 𝐸𝑂1) in quarter t for state-chartered or nationally-chartered banks in state s 
during quarter t, respectively; 𝑊𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state level macroeconomic and banking 
characteristics that describe economic and institutional variables, such as the share of assets held 
by state-chartered banks in the state-quarter; a proxy for the S&L crisis (captured by the ratio of 
assets in failed thrifts to total bank assets), the log of assets in failed banks, the mean bank 
profitability in the state; and a dummy equal to 1 if a Democrat is state governor (0 otherwise) to 
capture political parties’ willingness to regulate the financial sector.16 𝛼𝑠 and 𝜋𝑡 are state- and 
quarter-fixed effects, respectively; 𝜇𝑠𝑡 is the error term. 
Our data spans the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2 for the 15 states that introduced state 
depositor preference before the introduction of national depositor preference. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. We drop a state from the analysis once depositor preference is 
introduced.  
                                           
16  In Panel A of Table 3, earnings opacity is measured using 𝐸𝑂1, the opacity measure constructed using equation (1). The 
results in Panel A are unchanged using other opacity measures from Section IV.A. 
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The results of this test are presented in Panel A of Table 3. In Column (1) we include 
contemporaneous earnings opacity and the institutional control variables but find no significant 
relationship between these variables and the adoption of depositor preference. Next, we test 
whether previous values of earnings opacity affect the adoption of depositor preference law by 
including the level of earnings opacity in the previous eight quarters as independent variables in 
equation (7). The coefficients on the lags of earnings opacity reported in Column (2) of the table 
are all insignificant. The results are consistent with our review of news items and historical 
sources that show no systematic relationship between earnings opacity and adoption of the laws.  
 
 
D. Parallel trends between treatment and control group  
We next examine the key identifying assumption of parallel trends between state-
chartered and nationally-chartered banks to verify whether nationally-chartered banks constitute a 
valid counterfactual.
17
 Meyer (1995) points out that parallel movements between treatment and 
control groups would be expected in the pre-treatment period if there is no interaction between 
the treatment and the outcome variables.  
 [TABLE 3] 
We follow Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and Roberts and Whited (2013) by using t-tests 
to examine differences in the growth rate of earnings opacity between state-chartered and 
nationally-chartered banks. We conduct these tests for the four quarters preceding imposition of 
depositor preference. The insignificant t-statistics in Panel B of Table 3 indicate that equality 
holds in all cells, and that the groups share parallel trends. Nationally-chartered banks represent a 
                                           
17  Differences in levels across treatment and control groups do not compromise the validity of the estimator as they are netted 
out by bank-fixed effects in equation (6). See Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and Roberts and Whited (2013). 
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valid counterfactual of how state-chartered banks’ earnings opacity would have evolved in the 
absence of depositor preference.
 
 
V. Main results 
We focus in Section V.A on the effects of the increase in monitoring incentives for 
nondepositors on earnings opacity. Section V.B examines alternative opacity measures, Section 
V.C explores further effects from the law changes, and Section V.D provides additional insights 
into the magnitude of the effects depending on banks’ reliance on nondeposit funds. 
A. Baseline results 
Table 4 shows the effect of the reallocation of monitoring incentives to nondepositors on 
earnings opacity. Panel A presents the coefficients for the unsigned measures of earnings 
opacity. We report specifications with and without bank-specific control variables. Roberts and 
Whited (2013) highlight that, if a treatment is exogenous, then the coefficient estimates should 
be unaffected by the inclusion of control variables, because the treatment is unrelated to omitted 
variables contained in the error term.  
Greater monitoring incentives for nondepositors reduce earnings opacity. The key 
coefficient (the interaction term between the treatment group dummy and the post dummy 
variable) enters all tests negatively and significantly, and it remains similar, regardless of the 
inclusion of control variables. The control variables suggest that the lag of loan loss provisions is 
positively correlated with earnings opacity, but bank size plays no role. Higher capital ratios 
correlate negatively with opacity, and banks that incur losses tend to be more opaque.
 
  
Panel B reports the coefficients for income-increasing (negative) and income-decreasing 
(positive) residuals. This analysis is important because discretionary accounting choices that 
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overstate earnings through (income-increasing) negative residuals bolster bank capital. Negative 
residuals also understate the riskiness of banks’ lending.  
The reallocation of monitoring incentives does not affect income-decreasing residuals. 
However, discretionary provisioning that overstates earnings to make banks appear more 
profitable declines following the change in monitoring incentives. These findings suggest that the 
declines in the absolute values of residuals are driven by the laws limiting income-increasing 
discretionary provisioning. In terms of the economic magnitude, these figures suggest that the 
decline in earnings overstatements is equivalent to a reduction of understatements of loan loss 
provisions by between 8.2 and 8.7 percent. 
[TABLE 4] 
 
B. Alternative measures of bank opacity  
We now investigate three alternative opacity measures to rule out that our inferences are 
driven by measurement issues and a focus on discretionary accounting choices.   
Column (1) in Table 5 shows that using the Bushman and Williams (2012) approach to 
calculate the residuals leaves our inferences unchanged. Likewise, we find in Column (2) that 
OREO falls significantly within the treatment group. Economically, the treatment effect 
represents an 8.3 percent reduction in opacity. Consistent with the previous results, we also find 
significant reductions in opacity when measured using OPAQUE. In Column (3), the interaction 
coefficient indicates a 2.1 percent decline in OPAQUE within the treatment group relative to the 
counterfactual. 
[TABLE 5] 
C. Further effects of the reallocation of monitoring incentives  
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The increase in monitoring incentives for nondepositors may have additional effects 
beyond reducing opacity.  
First, it may trigger the collateralization of nondeposit claims and a shortening of the 
maturity structure of these claims (Hirschorn and Zervos (1990); Thomson (1994)). Second, it 
may alter regulators’ monitoring incentives (Pages and Santos (2003)) to the extent that 
regulatory monitoring, rather than nondepositor monitoring, may drive the documented reduction 
in opacity.
18
 Third, there may be complex interactions between regulators’ and nondepositors’ 
monitoring incentives, soundness, changes in nondeposit claims’ maturity structure, and the 
collateralization of such claims (Pages and Santos (2003)). These additional effects pose a key 
challenge to establishing a causal effect of nondepositor monitoring incentives on opacity 
because both the collateralization of nondeposit claims and the reductions in maturity structure 
undermine nondepositor monitoring incentives (Manove et al. (2001)). 
We aim to disentangle these effects and control for these interactions. Since Section V.B 
shows that measurement issues are not driving our inferences, all subsequent tests use opacity 
measures that focus on earnings opacity, i.e., the measures based on residuals. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows in Column (1) that depositor preference laws significantly 
increase the collateralization of nondeposit claims. Column (2) illustrates that the share of 
nondeposit claims with a maturity of one year or less also increases significantly. In Column (3), 
we use the distance in miles (in logs) between the bank’s headquarters and the nearest regulator 
field office as a measure of ex-ante regulatory monitoring as a dependent variable.
19
 This test 
                                           
18
  State-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System have two supervisors. The corresponding state 
supervisor and one federal supervisor. State-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System have only the 
FDIC as a supervisor. These potential differences in regulatory intensity are captured in the bank-fixed effects.  
19  Anecdotal evidence supports the view that regulatory monitoring was not affected by the change in debtholders’ monitoring 
incentives. A review of the FDIC’s History of the 80s suggests that regulators reduced examiner resources at state and federal 
agencies until the mid-1980s. Examiner figures declined for the FDIC, the OCC, and for state regulators. There are also 
decreases in the number of examinations and increases in the interval between examinations. Evidence for Texas (which 
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shows that the reallocation of monitoring incentives for debtholders does not affect ex-ante 
regulatory monitoring.
20
  
To rule out that changes in collateralization and maturity structure undermine the effect 
of the switch in monitoring incentives of nondepositors on earnings opacity, Panel B of Table 6 
replicates our regressions from Panel A of Table 4 but controls for collateralization and 
nondeposit maturity structure. To reflect on the interaction of the change in monitoring 
incentives of nondepositors with the incentives of regulators, our tests now also include the 
distance in miles (in logs) between the bank’s headquarters and the nearest regulator field office 
as measure of ex-ante regulatory monitoring.  
[TABLE 6] 
These tests reinforce the view that the change in monitoring incentives for nondepositors 
affects earnings opacity beyond its effects on collateralization, maturity structure, and regulatory 
monitoring. The economic magnitudes remain similar to the baseline results.  
D. Further evidence for the role of nondepositors for adjustments in earnings opacity 
We now investigate the shift in monitoring incentives in more detail. Our first test 
examines whether earnings opacity responds more strongly in banks that are likely to be 
monitored more intensively. If nondepositors’ monitoring drives our results, banks that use more 
nondeposit funding, irrespective of who supplies these funds, should face greater scrutiny. Thus, 
decreases in earnings opacity should be greater in banks that use more nondeposits. This test 
                                                                                                                                        
adopted depositor preference in 1985), Louisiana (1985), and California (1986) comports with this nationwide pattern. The 
decline in resources reverses when increasing numbers of problem banks require more examiners and greater examination 
frequency from 1986 onward. However, while the average number of days between examinations in Texas declined by 1993, 
the number of examinations remained lower than at the beginning of our sample period. 
20  We also retrieve data on enforcement actions from the regulators’ websites as a measure of ex-post regulatory monitoring and 
use it as a dependent variable. The data are available from 1989Q1 onwards. Enforcement actions are issued if regulators 
uncover risky behavior and require banks to take corrective action (Danisewicz et al. (2018b)). If regulatory monitoring 
increases after the law changes, regulators may uncover more unsound behavior, resulting in more enforcement actions. In 
unreported tests, we find that adoption of depositor preference laws does not lead to significantly more regulatory monitoring 
as reflected in the number of enforcement actions.  
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examines the necessary condition that monitoring incentives play a role for the observed 
reductions in opacity.   
We test this in Panel A of Table 7 using the measures of earnings opacity as the 
dependent variable. We split the sample at the pre-treatment median of the share of nondeposit 
funding to total liabilities to ensure that the values are not affected by depositor preference. 
While the significance level is reduced, the coefficients show that banks that are likely to face 
larger increases in monitoring take greater steps to reduce opacity. Across all measures, the 
magnitude of the key coefficient is greater for banks with more nondeposits. Chow tests confirm 
significant differences of the coefficient estimates across all subsamples. 
Our second test examines monitoring ability. This is a sufficient condition for the effect 
on earnings opacity. We focus on banks’ dependence on Fed funds purchased because Fed funds 
are the most important component of nondeposit funds. Moreover, since Fed funds are supplied 
by banks, these claimants have the best understanding of the conditions in the banking industry. 
Panel B of Table 7 splits the sample at the pre-treatment median of the ratio of Fed funds 
purchased to total liabilities.  
The earnings adjustments are significantly larger in banks whose ratio of Fed funds 
purchased to total liabilities lies above the pre-treatment median of this ratio of all banks.  This 
finding is insensitive to the choice of the measure of earnings opacity. The Chow tests show that 
the coefficients are significantly different across the subsamples. These results suggest that 
providers of funds with greater monitoring ability have a greater effect on bank earnings opacity.  
The third set of tests focuses on nondepositor monitoring. We follow the approach in the 
market discipline literature that infers debtholder monitoring when debt prices display risk 
sensitivity (e.g., Flannery and Sorescu (1996)). Panel C of Table 7 shows that the cost of 
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nondeposit funds, reflected in the ratio of interest expenses on nondeposits to total liabilities, 
increase significantly in response to depositor preference in Column (1). The sample split at the 
median level of nondeposits to total liabilities in Column (2) illustrates that the increase in 
nondeposit funding costs is greater for those banks that use more of this type of funding, in line 
with our argument about nondepositor monitoring. The final set of tests show that the costs for 
the two main components of nondeposit funds, Fed funds purchased (Column 3), and 
subordinated debt funds (Column 4) increase by 19.4 and 23.3 percent, respectively.
21
  
[TABLE 7] 
 
VI. Factors that amplify and mitigate the effects of the reallocation of monitoring 
incentives 
Banking crises, the corresponding responses by regulators, and other changes in 
regulation may play a role for the effect of the reallocation of debtholders’ monitoring incentives 
on opacity. Likewise, bank-specific characteristics such as size, exposure to real estate assets, 
distress, public listing, and holding company membership may also correlate with opacity.  
A. The role of banking turmoil in New England, Texas, and the S&L crisis  
Huizinga and Laeven (2012) report that banks were more prone to become opaque during 
the recent crisis, and Knaup and Wagner (2012) highlight that correctly measuring credit risk, the 
key driver for loan loss provisions, is particularly difficult during crises.  
We therefore ask whether the disciplining effects from the increase in nondepositor 
monitoring are larger during crises. Panel A of Table 8 splits the sample into crisis and non crisis 
observations. We classify the observations for banks in Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, 
                                           
21  Fed funds are provided by other banks that are aware of the changes in regulation and are typically considered to be 
sophisticated monitors. Likewise, subordinated debt funds are usually held by large institutional investors that have better 
monitoring technologies than small atomistic depositors.  
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and Rhode Island for the period 1991Q1–1993Q3 as crisis episodes to reflect the New England 
banking crisis. To consider the Texas banking crisis, we classify observations from Texas for the 
period 1986Q1–1988Q4 as a crisis. Our tests show that the economic magnitude of the 
reductions in earnings opacity is significantly larger during crises. Chow tests confirm this 
finding. 
Unlike the New England and Texas crises, the S&L crisis was not limited to one region 
but caused failures nationwide between 1986 and 1995. Panel B of Table 8 therefore includes an 
additional interaction between the treatment group dummy and the S&L crisis variable to capture 
whether the S&L crisis drives the inferences. The effect of depositor preference law on earnings 
opacity remains robust. There is no evidence that the S&L crisis differentially affected opacity 
between state- and nationally-chartered banks.  
[TABLE 8] 
B. The role of deregulation, bank mergers, and regulatory responses to banking crises  
Our sample period is characterized by changes in regulation. The removal of branching 
restrictions resulted in 38 states lifting obstacles to intrastate and interstate branching that trigger 
entry of new competitors and a period of mergers and acquisitions. While there is little 
correlation between the timing of deregulation and the introduction of state depositor preference 
laws, Jiang et al. (2016) show that tougher competition arising from the removal of branching 
restrictions reduced earnings opacity.  
All our tests contain state-quarter-fixed effects that capture the effects of both types of 
deregulation on all banks in a given quarter. To investigate differential effects on state-chartered 
banks and nationally-chartered banks from the reallocation of monitoring incentives to 
nondepositors, Table 9 contains an interaction between the treatment group dummy and a 
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dummy that takes on the value of one if a state permits interstate branching (0 otherwise) in 
Panel A, and an interaction between the treatment group dummy and a dummy that takes the 
value of one if a state permits intrastate branching (0 otherwise) in Panel B. The findings for the 
key coefficient of interest are qualitatively similar.  
We investigate the effects of consolidation in the banking industry further and collect 
data on bank mergers and acquisitions from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
22
 We focus 
first on a subsample of banks involved in mergers and acquisitions in Panel C. In Panel D, we 
restrict the sample to banks that are not involved in mergers and acquisitions. In both cases we 
find that introducing state depositor preference laws significantly reduces earnings opacity for 
the treated banks, and the effect is somewhat more pronounced for banks involved in mergers 
and acquisitions.
23
  
The banking problems described in Section VI.A resulted in a tightening of regulation 
with the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act in 1989 (FIRREA), and 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. FIRREA 
provided the authorities with more resources to resolve banks, and FDICIA contained further 
efforts to bolster soundness. While the effects of these two pieces of legislation are captured by 
the state-quarter-fixed effects, we construct a dummy variable, FIRREA, that takes on the value 
of one in the quarters from 1989Q1 (0 otherwise), and interact this dummy with the treatment 
group dummy in Panel E. The coefficient estimate on the key interaction term remains similar to 
the baseline estimates. In Panel F, we generate a dummy variable, FDICIA, that equals 1 for the 
quarters from 1992Q1 (0 otherwise), and interact the FDICIA dummy with the treatment group 
                                           
22  See https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/merger-data.   
23  In unreported tests, we rerun our regressions and remove banks from the sample that are acquired and banks that are the 
acquirer. The effects are equally pronounced and do not change our inferences.  
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dummy. Despite this change, the TG-Post coefficient remains negative and significant. These 
two pieces of legislation do not interfere with our inferences. 
[TABLE 9] 
C. The role of size, loan portfolio composition, soundness, listing, and BHC membership  
Opacity is also affected by bank-specific characteristics. Huizinga and Laeven (2012) 
report that banks are particularly prone to opacity if they are large and have more exposure to 
real estate assets. They also state that bank distress results in greater opacity. Likewise, Beatty et 
al. (2002) and Beatty and Liao (2014) highlight that bank characteristics such as public listing 
and holding company membership affect both abilities and incentives to manage earnings.   
To examine these cross sectional predictions, we split the sample at the median level of 
bank size in terms of total assets in Panel A of Table 10, at the median level of the ratio of real 
estate loans to total loans in Panel B, and at the median level of the probability of bank failure in 
Panel C.
24
 All sample splits use the pre-treatment median values. The key coefficients are 
significantly greater in magnitude for larger banks. While there are significant opacity-reducing 
effects for banks below the median of the ratio of real estate loans to total loans, the interaction 
coefficient is always larger for banks whose exposure is above the median. The findings 
concerning soundness, approximated with the probability of failure, are also in line with the 
predictions. The magnitudes for the key coefficient are only significantly negative for the banks 
whose failure probability is above the median. Chow tests confirm that the coefficients are 
significantly different across subsamples.   
Panel D explores whether the effects differ across listed and unlisted banks. The 
introduction of depositor preference laws leads to a significant decline in earnings opacity within 
both groups. However, listed banks respond to a greater extent. These results extend prior work 
                                           
24  Online Appendix Table B.2 presents the regression estimates for our failure prediction model.   
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by Beatty et al. (2002). They show listed banks are more opaque compared to unlisted ones. It is 
plausible therefore that the marginal effect of depositor preference law on earnings opacity is 
greater within listed banks because they have greater scope to reduce opacity relative to an 
unlisted bank that is ex-ante less opaque. 
Panel E compares banks that are members of bank holding companies (BHCs) with 
independent banks. For both groups, earnings opacity within state-chartered banks significantly 
decreases following implementation of depositor preference law, but the effect is somewhat 
stronger among independent banks. The unconditional mean for the earnings opacity measure is 
higher for independent banks relative to BHC member banks, in line with greater autonomy for 
such banks (Aghion and Tirole (1997)). For these banks, depositor preference introduces greater 
market discipline, resulting in a greater reduction of earnings opacity.  
[TABLE 10] 
VII. Other sensitivity checks  
This section discusses further sensitivity checks. We first focus on omitted variables, then 
we replicate our main tests using an alternative control group. Finally, we address concerns 
regarding anticipation effects, and we also consider an alternative treatment of standard errors.   
A. Omitted variables 
Recall that our main tests include state-quarter-fixed effects. Therefore, the primary 
threats to inference are time-varying shocks that differentially affect the treatment and control 
groups. Furthermore, any omitted variable must coincide with the 15 separate enactments of 
depositor preference laws to bias our inferences. Omitted variables that satisfy these criteria 
simultaneously are unlikely to exist. In this subsection, we address three plausible threats to 
identification. 
30 
 
 
First, we assuage concerns about differences in the geographical coverage between state-
chartered and nationally-chartered banks in terms of the geographical reach of their activities. 
We use an interaction term in Panel A of Online Appendix Table B.3 between the treatment 
group dummy and the number of counties each bank operates in. Our inferences endure. 
Second, our main tests include state-quarter-fixed effects that sweep out state-specific 
time-varying shocks. Panel B of Online Appendix Table B.3 takes this issue further because 
earnings management may be countercyclical. We therefore examine whether macroeconomic 
fluctuations confound our inferences and include an interaction between the treatment group 
dummy and the state unemployment rate (UNEMP). The effect of depositor preference laws on 
earnings opacity is robust to this change. 
Third, the rotation of regulators documented in Agarwal et al. (2014) may coincide with 
changes in regulatory monitoring activity. To address this, we interact the treatment group 
dummy with a dummy that takes on the value of one if the bank is regulated by the FDIC (0 
otherwise) in Panel C of Online Appendix Table B.3. Our key inferences are unaffected.
25
   
B. Validity of the counterfactual  
Our tests for parallel trends suggest that the control group is observationally similar to the 
treatment group and therefore constitutes a valid counterfactual. However, banking markets are 
local in nature. A concern may be that the introduction of depositor preference laws results in a 
reallocation of state-chartered banks’ nondeposits to nationally-chartered banks in the 
neighbourhood, suggesting that the control group may be indirectly affected by the treatment 
which could bias our coefficient of interest.  
                                           
25  The results in Panel B of Table B.1 show that removing banks that switch charter status during the sample, and therefore 
potentially change supervisor, does not drive our findings.  
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To mitigate this concern, we use a 1:1 nearest neighbor matching strategy with 
replacement following Lemmon and Roberts (2010). First, we use a probit model to estimate 
(8)       𝑇𝐺𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑏 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑏 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑏 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑏 
+𝛽6𝑁𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑏 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑏 + 𝜀𝑏, 
where 𝑇𝐺𝑏 is a dummy equal to 1 if bank 𝑏 is state-chartered in the pre-treatment period 
(0 otherwise); 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑏, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑏, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑏, 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑏, 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑏, 𝑁𝐷𝑀𝑆𝑏, and 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑏 are the 
mean loan loss provision, size, capital ratio, collateralization of nondeposit claims, nondeposit 
maturity structure and distance to the nearest regulator office for bank 𝑏 in the pre-treatment 
period. 
We then compute propensity scores using the estimates obtained from equation (8). Bank 
b's nearest neighbor is the bank with the most similar propensity score. We also impose the 
condition that the propensity score must lie within a 0.01 range of bank b's propensity score. Our 
matched sample pairs one state-chartered bank with one propensity score matched nationally-
chartered bank, resulting in a sample with 77,269 observations. Online Appendix Table B.4 
replicates our main tests but uses the alternative matched control group. The average treatment 
effect is larger than in the baseline models.  
C. Anticipation effects and precision of the standard errors 
Banks may have expected the introduction of depositor preference and restricted 
discretionary provisioning before the adoption of these laws. To test this, we use four placebo 
dummy variables equal to 1 in the first, second, third, and fourth quarter before depositor 
preference enactment (0 otherwise) and interact these placebo dummies with the treatment group 
indicator. The placebo interactions in Panel A of Online Appendix Table B.5 remain 
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insignificant, suggesting that anticipation does not affect our inferences. Another benefit of this 
test is that it supports the validity of the parallel trends assumption. 
Difference-in-differences estimates are sensitive to the treatment of standard errors. So 
far, all tests cluster the standard errors at the state level. Our test statistics are therefore based on 
the most conservative standard errors. As an alternative to addressing the question of too few 
blocks of clusters, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and collapse the data on a single pre- and 
post-treatment mean for each bank and use robust standard errors. Our estimates remain robust in 
Panel B of Online Appendix Table B.5. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Opacity is a key aspect in banking because it hinders the ability of outsiders to assess 
bank value and risk. In recent years, regulatory authorities have taken steps to increase 
transparency by performing stress tests, releasing the results to the public, and changing 
legislation to incentivize greater monitoring of bank behavior.  
We investigate whether nondepositors’ monitoring incentives play a role for bank opacity. 
To this end, we study whether the introduction of state depositor preference laws that reallocate 
monitoring incentives from senior to junior debtholders affects banks’ discretionary loan loss 
provisioning, the level of real estate owned, and the level of other types of opaque assets banks 
hold on the balance sheet.   
We document three key results. First, we show that assigning a junior claim to 
nondepositors reduces bank opacity by economically meaningful magnitudes. This finding is 
primarily driven by banks restricting discretionary provisioning to increase earnings. Second, we 
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document that the reallocation of monitoring incentives is particularly effective in reducing 
earnings opacity during crises. This is beneficial because information asymmetries are 
particularly pronounced during episodes of turmoil. Third, we find that larger banks, banks with 
greater exposure to real estate markets, unsound banks, listed banks, and independent banks 
display a greater responsiveness to the greater monitoring incentives of nondepositors.    
Given concerns about the consequences of bank opacity, this research is timely and 
policy-relevant. Our findings support innovations in regulation, such as the introduction of 
depositor priority laws in the European Union after the crisis that call for more monitoring by 
sophisticated creditors. The change in regulation which we study incentivizes stronger 
monitoring by nondepositors which we show to have potential to reduce bank opacity. 
These results generalize beyond our setting. Many small and medium-sized banks in 
Europe and the U.S. exhibit similar balance sheet characteristics to those in our sample. They 
also depend on nondeposit funding to finance new projects (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010)). This suggests considerable potential for improving bank transparency by subordinating 
the claims of nondepositors to those of depositors.  
Our findings point to a largely neglected role of nondepositors’ monitoring incentives in 
reducing information asymmetries and improving information quality and accuracy. They also 
illustrate an efficient way to strengthen nondepositors’ monitoring incentives. To this extent, 
these results highlight a role for depositor priority in the regulatory framework.     
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 Figure 1 
Timing of state depositor preference adoption 
 
 
Notes:  Figure 1 presents the timing of depositor preference adoption based on Marino and Bennett (1999). States that enter 
our empirical tests are denoted by a circle, while all other states that introduced depositor preference are denoted by a 
triangle. The date of adoption is presented in parentheses. The adoption date is assumed to be 1 Jan 1974 for Georgia 
because the adoption date in 1974 is not recorded. Depositor preference passed both houses during 1979 in Idaho, but 
the enactment date is unclear, and we assume 1 Jan 1979. Texas amended its law in 1993Q2 and did not have 
depositor preference until national depositor preference was enacted in August 1993.  
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Table 1 
Claim structure with and without state depositor preference law  
             Claim structure without depositor preference           Claim structure with depositor preference 
1. Receiver (FDIC) 1. Receiver (FDIC) 
2. Secured creditors 2. Secured creditors 
3. Insured depositors 3. Insured and uninsured depositors 
4. Uninsured depositors and nondeposit creditors 4. Nondeposit creditors 
5. Shareholders 5. Shareholders 
Notes:  This table provides an overview of debt priority claim structure with and without depositor preference law. In the 
codified text of the state laws, provisions concerning depositor preference are typically presented under headings titled 
“Involuntary Liquidation Procedure”, “Payment of Claims”, or “Distribution of Assets”. Although the exposition differs 
across states, the priority structure for the claims on failed state-chartered banks converges to the structure presented in 
this table. See also Thomson (1994), Osterberg (1996) and Marino and Bennett (1999).  
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Table 2 
Summary statistics and variable definitions 
Panel A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
TG A dummy variable equal to 1 if bank b in state s at time t is state-chartered, 0 otherwise. 
Post A dummy variable equal to 1 if depositor preference law is in force in state s at time t, 0 otherwise. 
𝐸𝑂1 The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
absolute value of the residual calculated based on equation (1).  
𝐸𝑂2 The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
absolute value of the residual calculated based on equation (2). 
𝐸𝑂3 The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
absolute value of the residual calculated based on equation (3). 
𝐸𝑂4 The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
absolute value of the residual calculated based on equation (4). 
𝐸𝑂1+ The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
positive signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (1). 
𝐸𝑂1− The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
negative signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (1). 
𝐸𝑂2+ The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
positive signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (2). 
𝐸𝑂2− The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
negative signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (2). 
𝐸𝑂3+ The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
positive signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (3). 
𝐸𝑂3− The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
negative signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (3). 
𝐸𝑂4+ The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
positive signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (4). 
𝐸𝑂4− The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t outlined in Section IV.A, defined as the 
negative signed value of the residual calculated based on equation (4). 
𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑊 The natural logarithm of earnings opacity in bank b in state s at time t defined as the absolute value of the residual 
calculated based on equation (5). 
OREO The natural logarithm of the ratio of other real estate owned relative to total loans in bank b in state s at time t. 
OPAQUE The natural logarithm of the sum of the book value of bank premises and fixed assets, investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, intangible assets and the balance sheet category “other assets”. 
LLPt-1 The lagged ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans in bank b in state s at time t. 
Bank size The natural logarithm of total assets of bank b in state s at time t. 
Capital ratio The natural logarithm of the ratio of equity capital to total assets in bank b in state s at time t. 
Loss A dummy variable equal to 1 if bank b in state s at time t reports 𝑅𝑂𝐴 < 0, 0 otherwise. 
Collateralization The natural logarithm of the sum of pledged securities, federal fund repos, standby letters of credit, and secured 
pledged deposits to total nondeposit liabilities for bank b in state s at time t. 
ND maturity structure The natural logarithm of the ratio of nondeposits with a maturity of 1 year or less to total nondeposits for bank b in 
state s at time t. 
Distance to regulator office The distance in hundreds of miles between the bank’s headquarters and the nearest field office of the corresponding 
regulator (OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, or state regulator) for bank b in state s at time t. 
ND costs The natural logarithm of the ratio of nondeposit interest expenses to nondeposit liabilities for bank b in state s at time 
t. 
Fed funds costs The natural logarithm of the ratio of Fed fund expenses to Fed fund liabilities for bank b in state s at time t. 
Subordinated debt costs The natural logarithm of the ratio of interest expenses on subordinated debt for bank b in state s at time t. 
Intrastate A dummy variable equal to 1 if state s permits intrastate bank branching at time t, 0 otherwise.  
Interstate A dummy variable equal to 1 if state s permits interstate bank branching at time t, 0 otherwise. 
FIRREA A dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is from 1989Q1 onwards, 0 otherwise. 
FDICIA A dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is from 1992Q2 onwards, 0 otherwise. 
Number of counties Number of counties in which bank b has at least one branch at time t. 
UNEMP The unemployment rate (%) in state s at time t. 
FDIC A dummy variable equal to 1 if bank b in state s at time t is regulated by the FDIC, 0 otherwise. 
Placebot-1 A dummy variable equal to 1 in the quarter prior to depositor preference law being enacted in state s, 0 otherwise. 
Placebot-2 A dummy variable equal to 1 in the quarter two quarters prior to depositor preference law being enacted in state s, 0 
otherwise. 
Placebot-3 A dummy variable equal to 1 in the quarter three quarters prior to depositor preference law being enacted in state s, 0 
otherwise. 
Placebot-4 A dummy variable equal to 1 in the quarter four quarters prior to depositor preference law being enacted in state s, 0 
otherwise. 
Charter switch A dummy variable equal to 1 if bank b in state s at time t switches charter, 0 otherwise. 
NPA The ratio of nonperforming assets to total loans in bank b in state s at time t. 
Cost income ratio The ratio of salaries and employee benefits plus expenses on premises to income in bank b in state s at time t. 
Cash The natural logarithm of cash holdings in bank b in state s at time t. 
ΔLoan Change in total loans to lagged total loans in bank b in state s at time t. 
ΔGSP The growth rate of Gross State Product in state s at time t. 
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CSRET  The Case-Shiller Index in state s at time t. 
ALW Is the ratio of loan loss allowances to total loans in bank b in state s at time t. 
CO Net charge-offs divided by lagged total loans in bank b in state s at time t. 
Profit The ratio of net earnings before loan loss provisions to lagged total loans in bank b in state s at time t.  
OpacitySC The mean of 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
1  among state-chartered banks in state s at time t. 
OpacityNC The mean of 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
1  among nationally-chartered banks in state s at time t. 
State-chartered assets The ratio of assets held by state-chartered banks in state s at time t to total bank assets in the state at time t. 
S&L Crisis The ratio of assets in failed thrifts to total bank assets in state s at time t. 
Assets in all failed banks The natural logarithm of total assets in failed banks in state s at time t. 
Bank profitability The mean of ROA of all banks operating in state s at time t. 
Democrat governor A dummy variable equal to 1 if the state governor belongs to the Democratic Party in state s at time t, 0 otherwise.  
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics      
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev 5th percentile 95th percentile 
TG 205,057 0.6436 0.4789 0 1 
Post 205,057 0.5876 0.4923 0 1 
𝐸𝑂1 205,057 0.0033 0.0043 0.0003 0.0109 
𝐸𝑂2 205,057 0.0033 0.0043 0.0003 0.0109 
𝐸𝑂3 205,057 0.0033 0.0043 0.0003 0.0109 
𝐸𝑂4 205,057 0.0033 0.0043 0.0003 0.0108 
𝐸𝑂1+ 58,402 0.0056 0.0070 0.0002 0.0216 
𝐸𝑂1− 146,655 -0.0024 0.0019 -0.0049 -0.0004 
𝐸𝑂2+ 58,275 0.0056 0.0070 0.0002 0.0216 
𝐸𝑂2− 146,782 -0.0023 0.0019 -0.0049 -0.0004 
𝐸𝑂3+ 58,252 0.0056 0.0070 0.0002 0.0216 
𝐸𝑂3− 146,805 -0.0023 0.0019 -0.0049 -0.0004 
𝐸𝑂4+ 58,290 0.0055 0.0070 0.0002 0.0216 
𝐸𝑂4− 146,767 -0.0023 0.0019 -0.0049 -0.0004 
𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑊 205,057 0.0033 0.0044 0.0003 0.0109 
OREO 205,057 0.0167 0.0307 0.0003 0.0667 
OPAQUE 205,057 0.0544 0.7209 0.0016 0.0982 
LLPt-1  205,057 9.2329 0.1313 9.2103 9.2823 
Bank size  205,057 10.6542 1.1706 9.0397 12.7470 
Capital ratio 205,057 0.0840 0.0334 0.0433 0.1400 
Loss 205,057 0.1480 0.3551 0 1 
Collateralization 205,057 0.1479 0.1110 0.0113 0.3490 
ND maturity structure 205,057 0.1706 1.4978 0 0.6738 
Distance to regulator office 205,057 1.5004 2.0927 0.0387 4.3845 
ND costs 205,057 0.0175 0.0719 0 0.0671 
Fed Funds costs 205,057 0.0228 0.4091 0 0.0748 
Subordinated debt costs 205,057 0.0044 0.1183 0 0.0308 
Intrastate 205,057 0.4605 0.4984 0 1 
Interstate 205,057 0.2402 0.4272 0 1 
S&L crisis 205,057 0.0207 0.0566 0 0.4569 
FIRREA 205,057 0.2728 0.4454 0 1 
FDICIA 205,057 0.1253 0.3310 0 1 
Number of counties 205,057 1.2562 1.814 1 2 
UNEMP 205,057 6.4764 1.6362 4.3 9.27 
FDIC 205,057 0.2475 0.4316 0 1 
Placebot-1 205,057 0.0266 0.1609 0 1 
Placebo t-2 205,057 0.0265 0.1606 0 1 
Placebo t-3 205,057 0.0264 0.1603 0 1 
Placebo t-4 205,057 0.0265 0.1606 0 1 
Charter switch 205,057 0.0322 0.1766 0 1 
NPA 205,057 0.0103 0.0162 0 0.0393 
Cost income ratio 205,057 0.1133 0.1289 0.0001 0.3273 
Cash 205,057 0.0558 0.0704 0.0000 0.1875 
ΔLoan 205,057 0.0233 0.4148 -0.0856 0.1460 
ΔGSP 205,057 0.0085 0.0344 -0.0715 0.0643 
CSRET  205,057 66.4035 9.7618 50.75 77.05 
ALW 205,057 0.0098 0.0112 0.0028 0.0231 
CO 205,057 0.0057 0.0185 0 0.0258 
OpacitySC 888 0.0018 0.0008 0.0002 0.0126 
OpacityNC 888 0.0018 0.0010 0.0003 0.0098 
State-chartered assets 888 0.6587 0.1171 0.5155 0.8975 
S&L Crisis 888 0.0104 0.0358 0 0.0448 
Assets in all failed banks 888 0.0098 0.0353 0.0001 0.0441 
Bank profitability 888 0.0029 0.0009 0.0013 0.0042 
Democrat governor 888 0.5366 0.4989 0 1 
Notes:  All variables are reported in levels except Bank size and LLPt-1 which are reported in natural logarithms. 
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Table 3 
Exogeneity of depositor preference laws with respect to earnings opacity and tests for parallel trends 
Panel A: Political economy environment of state depositor preference law adoption 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Post dummy variable (representing the adoption of state depositor preference law) 
Opacityt
SC -0.0015  
 (-0.12)  
Opacityt
NC -0.0045  
 (-0.44)  
Opacityt−1
SC   0.0071 
  (0.61) 
Opacityt−1
NC   -0.0055 
  (-0.59) 
Opacityt−2
SC   -0.0036 
  (-0.24) 
Opacityt−2
NC   0.0141 
  (1.01) 
Opacityt−3
SC   0.0003 
  (0.01) 
Opacityt−3
NC   0.0215 
  (1.20) 
Opacityt−4
SC   0.0059 
  (0.41) 
Opacityt−4
NC   0.0294 
  (1.36) 
Opacityt−5
SC   -0.0003 
  (-0.02) 
Opacityt−5
NC   -0.0031 
  (-0.14) 
Opacityt−6
SC   0.0045 
  (0.28) 
Opacityt−6
NC   -0.0045 
  (-0.22) 
Opacityt−7
SC   0.0111 
  (0.93) 
Opacityt−7
NC   -0.0265 
  (-1.62) 
Opacityt−8
SC   0.0075 
  (0.85) 
Opacityt−8
NC   0.0098 
  (0.41) 
State-chartered assets -0.0336 -0.0675 
 (-0.28) (-0.67) 
S&L crisis -0.1001 -0.1544** 
 (-1.68) (-2.11) 
Assets in all failed banks 0.0004 0.0002 
 (1.68) (0.68) 
Bank profitability 0.0218 0.0204 
 (1.44) (1.05) 
Democrat governor 0.0069 0.0039 
 (0.42) (0.25) 
State FE Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes 
Observations 888 888 
R
2
 0.1570 0.1721 
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            Panel B: Parallel trends 
 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
Time State 
Charter 
National 
Charter 
Difference t-statistic 
State 
Charter 
National 
Charter 
Difference t-statistic 
State 
Charter 
National 
Charter 
Difference t-statistic 
State 
Charter 
National 
Charter 
Difference t-statistic 
𝑡 − 1 -6.2245 -6.2180 0.0065 0.06 -6.2354 -6.2923 -0.0569 -0.46 -6.2301 -6.2969 -0.0667 -0.56 -6.2253 -6.3012 -0.0759 -0.64 
 (0.0863) (0.0789) (0.1169)  (0.0934) (0.0804) (0.1241)  (0.0920) (0.0747) (0.1195)  (0.0911) (0.0736) (0.1181)  
𝑡 − 2 -6.2131 -6.1571 0.0560 0.62 -6.1560 -6.1392 0.0168 0.12 -6.2193 -6.1557 0.0636 0.37 -6.1843 -6.1501 0.0341 0.24 
 (0.0665) (0.0614) (0.0904)  (0.1056) (0.0938) (0.1420)  (0.1388) (0.0935) (0.1698)  (0.1126) (0.0922) (0.1468)  
𝑡 − 3 -6.1900 -6.1240 0.0659 0.84 -6.1694 -6.0955 0.0739 0.41 -6.1555 -6.0974 0.0581 0.35 -6.1526 -6.0960 0.0566 0.34 
 (0.0607) (0.0499) (0.0788)  (0.1527) (0.0899) (0.1807)  (0.1391) (0.0893) (0.1682)  (0.1357) (0.0896) (0.1653)  
𝑡 − 4 -6.1840 -6.1342 0.0498 0.70 -6.1852 -6.1874 -0.0022 -0.01 -6.1755 -6.1972 -0.0216 -0.12 -6.1857 -6.1895 -0.0038 -0.02 
 (0.0510) (0.0489) (0.0716)  (0.0991) (0.1548) (0.1757)  (0.0957) (0.1568) (0.1743)  (0.0983) (0.1555) (0.1754)  
Notes:  Panel A reports estimates of a linear probability model for equation (7). The results are unchanged when we construct 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝐶 and 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝐶 using the alternative measures of 
opacity described in Section IV.A. Observations from quarters after depositor preference law enactment are excluded. Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. 
The standard errors are clustered at the state level and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel B presents results of t-tests on the 
equality of the growth rate of the earnings opacity variables in the pre-treatment periods t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4 between the treatment and control groups.   
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Table 4 
Effects of nondepositors’ monitoring incentives on bank earnings opacity 
Panel A: Unsigned measures of earnings opacity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 𝐸𝑂4 
TG -0.0644 -0.0059 -0.0602 -0.0010 -0.0624 -0.0030 -0.0630 -0.0037 
 (-1.21) (-0.18) (-1.09) (-0.03) (-1.13) (-0.09) (-1.15) (-0.11) 
TG * Post -0.0579*** -0.0641*** -0.0602*** -0.0667*** -0.0587*** -0.0654*** -0.0594*** -0.0659*** 
 (-3.10) (-3.68) (-3.07) (-3.68) (-3.01) (-3.67) (-3.07) (-3.70) 
LLP𝑡−1 0.6277*** 0.2938*** 0.5865*** 0.2533*** 0.6109*** 0.2788*** 0.5718*** 0.2383*** 
 (4.77) (6.77) (3.97) (4.23) (5.58) (9.46) (4.68) (7.08) 
Bank size  0.0247  0.0166  0.0125  0.0166 
  (1.53)  (1.03)  (0.77)  (1.02) 
Capital ratio  -0.0930***  -0.0941***  -0.0934***  -0.0939*** 
  (-4.47)  (-4.52)  (-4.39)  (-4.48) 
Loss  0.7636***  0.7649***  0.7647***  0.7656*** 
  (25.87)  (25.94)  (24.95)  (25.20) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.1704 0.2217 0.1734 0.2247 0.1756 0.2265 0.1747 0.2259 
Panel B: Signed measures of earnings opacity 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1+ 𝐸𝑂1− 𝐸𝑂2+ 𝐸𝑂2− 𝐸𝑂3+ 𝐸𝑂3− 𝐸𝑂4+ 𝐸𝑂4− 
TG -0.0392 -0.0107 -0.0323 -0.0029 -0.0327 -0.0095 -0.0300 -0.0103 
 (-0.45) (-0.30) (-0.40) (-0.08) (-0.42) (-0.26) (-0.38) (-0.29) 
TG * Post -0.0141 -0.0874*** -0.0173 -0.0906*** -0.0157 -0.0876*** -0.0212 -0.0859*** 
 (-0.31) (-5.87) (-0.39) (-5.83) (-0.38) (-5.66) (-0.49) (-5.59) 
LLP𝑡−1 -0.1048*** 0.2214** -0.1180*** 0.1243 -0.2229*** 0.4025*** -0.2553*** 0.4101*** 
 (-4.03) (2.17) (-4.03) (1.48) (-5.83) (7.68) (-7.00) (7.93) 
Bank size 0.2559*** -0.1622*** 0.2869*** -0.1886*** 0.2994*** -0.2029*** 0.2960*** -0.1967*** 
 (7.31) (-4.72) (9.36) (-5.98) (9.29) (-6.51) (9.38) (-6.36) 
Capital ratio -0.1366*** -0.0611 -0.1362*** -0.0664 -0.1353*** -0.0655 -0.1353*** -0.0642 
 (-7.88) (-1.46) (-7.88) (-1.60) (-7.63) (-1.61) (-7.69) (-1.58) 
Loss 1.2837*** 0.1241*** 1.2776*** 0.1282*** 1.2785*** 0.1231*** 1.2817*** 0.1226*** 
 (69.29) (9.23) (66.35) (9.57) (67.21) (8.89) (68.22) (8.87) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58,402 146,655 58,275 146,782 58,252 146,805 58,290 146,767 
R2 0.3884 0.2127 0.3865 0.2230 0.3832 0.2304 0.3833 0.2283 
Notes:  This table reports estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures EO1-EO4 as the dependent variable. 
Panel A uses the absolute value of the residuals as measure of earnings opacity. Panel B uses the signed residuals as 
measures of earnings opacity. Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The sample is restricted 
to banks in states that enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered at 
the state level and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** and ** 
indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Effects of increases in nondepositors’ monitoring incentives: Alternative measures of opacity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑊 OREO OPAQUE 
TG 0.0571* 0.3215** -0.0057 
 (1.97) (2.81) (-0.47) 
TG * Post -0.0676*** -0.0862* -0.0217* 
 (-3.22) (-1.74) (-1.92) 
LLP𝑡−1 0.3359*** 0.4223*** 0.2693*** 
 (8.14) (3.15) (3.35) 
Bank size 0.0368 -0.4320*** 0.0628*** 
 (1.62) (-7.16) (5.45) 
Capital ratio -0.0946*** -0.2925*** -0.0229*** 
 (-4.88) (-7.37) (-3.18) 
Loss 0.8017*** 0.4158*** -0.0072* 
 (20.71) (10.79) (-1.83) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2040 0.6199 0.8568 
Notes:  This table reports estimates of equation (6) using 𝐸𝑂𝐵𝑊, OREO, and OPAQUE as the dependent variable. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The sample is restricted to banks in states that 
enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Further effects of nondepositors’ monitoring incentives and controlling for additional factors 
Panel A: Collateralization, maturity structure, and distance to regulator office  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Collateralization ND maturity structure Distance to regulator office 
TG 0.0359 -0.3586 -0.7904** 
 (0.84) (-1.08) (-2.26) 
TG * Post 0.0642** 0.7446*** 0.0105 
 (2.23) (3.08) (0.70) 
LLP𝑡−1 -0.5302*** 0.0861 0.0024 
 (-8.52) (0.45) (0.26) 
Bank size 0.1080 0.4469*** -0.0090 
 (1.59) (3.58) (-1.65) 
Capital ratio -0.0097 0.1850*** 0.0015 
 (-0.67) (3.56) (0.38) 
Loss 0.0643*** -0.2198*** -0.0031 
 (4.45) (-4.37) (-1.73) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.4116 0.4439 0.9964 
Panel B: Bank earnings opacity with additional controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG 0.0050 0.0096 0.0077 0.0075 
 (0.14) (0.26) (0.21) (0.20) 
TG * Post -0.0630*** -0.0656*** -0.0643*** -0.0649*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.64) (-3.63) (-3.66) 
LLP𝑡−1 0.2942*** 0.2536*** 0.2791*** 0.2387*** 
 (6.77) (4.23) (9.45) (7.08) 
Bank size 0.0255 0.0174 0.0133 0.0175 
 (1.56) (1.07) (0.81) (1.06) 
Capital ratio -0.0927*** -0.0938*** -0.0931*** -0.0936*** 
 (-4.44) (-4.50) (-4.36) (-4.45) 
Loss 0.7632*** 0.7646*** 0.7644*** 0.7652*** 
 (25.82) (25.90) (24.90) (25.16) 
Collateralization 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.39) (0.31) (0.30) (0.35) 
ND maturity structure -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 (-3.27) (-3.25) (-3.34) (-3.21) 
Distance to regulator office 0.0146 0.0142 0.0142 0.0150 
 (0.85) (0.80) (0.78) (0.82) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2217 0.2248 0.2265 0.2259 
Notes:  This table reports estimates of equation (6) using collateralization, nondeposit maturity structure, and the distance to 
the regulator office as the dependent variable in Panel A. Panel B replicates the tests from Panel A of Table 4 but 
additionally controls for collateralization of nondeposit claims, ND maturity structure, and distance to the nearest 
regulator office. Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The sample is restricted to banks in 
states that enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. The standard errors are clustered at the 
state level and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** and ** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Further evidence for the responsiveness of bank earnings opacity to increases in nondepositors’ monitoring incentives 
Panel A: Sample split at the median of Nondeposit funding/Total liabilities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
Sample split < p50 ND/TL ≥ p50 ND/TL < p50 ND/TL ≥ p50 ND/TL < p50 ND/TL ≥ p50 ND/TL < p50 ND/TL ≥ p50 ND/TL 
TG 0.0047 -0.0261 0.0071 -0.0185 0.0090 -0.0238 0.0084 -0.0246 
 (0.11) (-0.48) (0.17) (-0.33) (0.22) (-0.42) (0.20) (-0.44) 
TG * Post -0.0497** -0.0686** -0.0493** -0.0748** -0.0489** -0.0720** -0.0490** -0.0729** 
 (-2.69) (-2.81) (-2.64) (-2.84) (-2.61) (-2.93) (-2.63) (-2.93) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,832 102,225 102,832 102,225 102,832 102,225 102,832 102,225 
R
2
 0.2347 0.2620 0.2368 0.2658 0.2375 0.2680 0.2373 0.2673 
Chow test F-statistic 13.61 13.74 13.73 13.86 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Sample split at the median of Fed funds purchased/Total liabilities 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
Sample split < p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
≥ p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
< p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
≥ p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
< p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
≥ p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
< p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
≥ p50 Fed funds 
purchased/TL 
TG 0.0015 0.0051 0.0064 0.0107 0.0033 0.0104 0.0016 0.0097 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.29) (0.08) (0.27) (0.04) (0.25) 
TG * Post -0.0549*** -0.0661*** -0.0586** -0.0680*** -0.0572** -0.0670*** -0.0583** -0.0672*** 
 (-3.05) (-3.09) (-2.76) (-3.22) (-2.94) (-3.10) (-2.96) (-3.12) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,672 102,385 102,672 102,385 102,672 102,385 102,672 102,385 
R
2
 0.2517 0.2472 0.2550 0.2497 0.2570 0.2512 0.2563 0.2508 
Chow test F-statistic 7.42 7.29 7.32 7.24 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel C: Depositor preference and the cost of nondeposit funds 
Dependent variable ND costs ND costs Fed Funds costs Subordinated debt costs 
Sample split Full sample < p50 ND/TL ≥ p50 ND/TL Full sample Full sample 
TG 0.1357 -0.0283 0.1377 -0.0171 0.2387 
 (0.53) (-0.05) (1.03) (-0.08) (0.76) 
TG * Post 0.3410*** 0.3262*** 0.3827*** 0.1772* 0.2092* 
 (4.35) (2.99) (4.60) (2.00) (1.91) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 102,826 102,231 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.6230 0.6792 0.5178 0.6046 0.6524 
Chow test F-statistic n/a 41.46 n/a n/a 
p-value n/a 0.00 n/a n/a 
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Notes:  Panels A and B of this table report estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures 𝐸𝑂1-𝐸𝑂4 as the dependent variable. Panel C reports 
estimates of equation (6) using nondeposit costs, Fed Funds costs, and subordinated debt costs as the dependent variable. The control variables are LLPt-1, 
Bank size, Capital ratio, and the Loss dummy. We split the sample at the pre-treatment median of the ratio of nondeposit funding to total liabilities in Panel 
A, and Panel B splits the sample at the pre-treatment median of the ratio of Fed funds purchased to total liabilities which ensures the values are unaffected by 
the passage of depositor preference laws. Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The sample is restricted to banks in states that 
enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. The Chow test F-statistic tests for equality between the coefficients in the models split 
above and below the median. The p-value is the p-value on the Chow test F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and the corresponding 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effects of increases in nondepositors’ monitoring incentives during crises and non crisis periods  
Panel A: Regional banking crises (New England and Texas) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 𝐸𝑂4 
Sample split Non Crisis Crisis Non Crisis Crisis Non Crisis Crisis Non Crisis Crisis 
TG -0.0055 0.1368 -0.0015 0.1257 -0.0035 0.1456 -0.0048 0.1588 
 (-0.21) (1.30) (-0.06) (1.20) (-0.13) (1.38) (-0.18) (1.51) 
TG * Post -0.0639*** -0.4008*** -0.0672*** -0.3611*** -0.0652*** -0.3844*** -0.0649*** -0.4029*** 
 (-5.79) (-4.54) (-6.10) (-4.10) (-5.89) (-4.36) (-5.87) (-4.57) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 179,563 25,494 179,563 25,494 179,563 25,494 179,563 25,494 
R2 0.2195 0.3113 0.2228 0.3144 0.2248 0.3146 0.2242 0.3140 
Chow test F-statistic 19.98 7.53 12.52 16.41 
p-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Panel B: S&L crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG -0.0058 -0.0009 -0.0029 -0.0036 
 (-0.18) (-0.03) (-0.08) (-0.10) 
TG * Post -0.0639*** -0.0663*** -0.0650*** -0.0654*** 
 (-3.39) (-3.43) (-3.37) (-3.40) 
TG * S&L crisis -0.0039 -0.0101 -0.0089 -0.0137 
 (-0.05) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.16) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2217 0.2247 0.2265 0.2259 
Notes:  This table reports estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures EO1-EO4 as the dependent variable. The 
control variables are LLPt-1, Bank size, Capital ratio, and the Loss dummy. Panel A focuses on the regional banking crises 
in New England and in Texas. The sample includes observations from Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island 
and Texas. Panel B focuses on the S&L crisis. As most states were affected by the S&L crisis, there are few observations of 
non crisis periods. We therefore interact the TG dummy with the S&L crisis variable to identify whether state-chartered 
banks were differentially affected by the S&L crisis. Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The 
sample is restricted to banks in states that enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. The Chow test 
F-statistic in Panel A tests for equality between the coefficients in the models split into non crisis and crisis periods. The p-
value is the p-value on the Chow test F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and the corresponding 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 9 
Effects of increases in nondepositors’ monitoring incentives, and changes in regulation and mergers 
Panel A: Interstate deregulation     Panel B: Intrastate deregulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG * Post -0.0354* -0.0398* -0.0383** -0.0385** -0.0411* -0.0448** -0.0435** -0.0438** 
 (-2.03) (-2.14) (-2.15) (-2.16) (-2.12) (-2.21) (-2.28) (-2.26) 
TG * Interstate -0.0850*** -0.0796** -0.0805*** -0.0813**     
 (-3.08) (-2.96) (-2.98) (-2.97)     
TG * Intrastate     -0.0565** -0.0537** -0.0538** -0.0544** 
     (-2.49) (-2.40) (-2.34) (-2.37) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2218 0.2249 0.2266 0.2260 0.2217 0.2248 0.2266 0.2260 
Panel C: Subsample - banks involved in M&A Panel D: Subsample – excluding banks involved in M&A 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG -0.0127 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0099 0.0095 0.0144 0.0114 0.0109 
 (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.24) (0.22) (0.33) (0.26) (0.25) 
TG * Post -0.0873*** -0.0920*** -0.0939*** -0.0933*** -0.0491** -0.0509** -0.0490** -0.0501** 
 (-4.02) (-3.75) (-4.04) (-4.15) (-2.28) (-2.32) (-2.24) (-2.28) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 45,422 45,422 45,422 45,422 159,635 159,635 159,635 159,635 
R2 0.2888 0.2921 0.2938 0.2934 0.1992 0.2023 0.2042 0.2035 
Panel E: Regulatory reforms – FIRREA Panel F: Regulatory reforms - FDICIA 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG * Post -0.0557*** -0.0583*** -0.0577*** -0.0581*** -0.0405** -0.0444** -0.0431** -0.0435** 
 (-3.76) (-3.64) (-3.71) (-3.71) (-2.35) (-2.40) (-2.43) (-2.44) 
TG * FIRREA -0.0276 -0.0275* -0.0255 -0.0257     
 (-1.69) (-1.82) (-1.59) (-1.56)     
TG * FDICIA     -0.1019*** -0.0959*** -0.0963*** -0.0968*** 
     (-3.42) (-3.12) (-3.32) (-3.37) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2217 0.2248 0.2265 0.2259 0.2219 0.2249 0.2267 0.2261 
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Notes:  This table reports estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures 𝐸𝑂1-𝐸𝑂4 as the dependent variable. Panel A focuses on interstate regulation and includes an 
interaction term between a dummy for interstate deregulation and the treatment group dummy. Panel B focuses on intrastate regulation and includes an interaction term 
between a dummy for intrastate deregulation and the treatment group dummy. Panel C (D) includes only banks that are (not) involved in M&A activity during the sample 
period.  Panel E focuses on FIRREA and includes an interaction term between the FIRREA dummy and the treatment group dummy. Panel F focuses on FDICIA and 
includes an interaction term between the FDICIA dummy and the treatment group dummy. The control variables are LLPt-1, Bank size, Capital ratio, and the Loss dummy. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The sample is restricted to banks in states that enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 
1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Effects of increases in nondepositors’ monitoring incentives and bank characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 𝐸𝑂4 
Panel A: Bank size         
Sample split 
Bank size Bank size Bank size Bank size 
<p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 
TG -0.0476 0.0379 -0.0465 0.0493 -0.0459 0.0455 -0.0462 0.0435 
 (-0.91) (1.29) (-0.89) (1.51) (-0.88) (1.41) (-0.88) (1.36) 
TG * Post -0.0466* -0.0613** -0.0456* -0.0690** -0.0453* -0.0665** -0.0456* -0.0666** 
 (-1.86) (-2.26) (-1.83) (-2.32) (-1.82) (-2.37) (-1.83) (-2.36) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,314 102,743 102,314 102,743 102,314 102,743 102,314 102,743 
R2 0.2096 0.2450 0.2100 0.2480 0.2098 0.2491 0.2100 0.2491 
Chow test F-statistic 5.26 5.44  5.38 5.44 
p-value 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Panel B: Real estate loans 
Sample split 
Real estate loans/Total 
loans 
Real estate loans/Total  
loans 
Real estate loans/Total 
loans 
Real estate loans/Total 
loans 
<p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 
TG -0.0843** 0.0457 -0.0824** 0.0539 -0.0815** 0.0527 -0.0809* 0.0489 
 (-2.19) (1.04) (-2.18) (1.19) (-2.19) (1.12) (-2.14) (1.06) 
TG * Post -0.0399** -0.0668* -0.0418** -0.0710** -0.0408** -0.0694** -0.0418** -0.0685* 
 (-2.40) (-2.04) (-2.37) (-2.23) (-2.22) (-2.17) (-2.30) (-2.12) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,430 107,772 102,430 107,772 102,430 107,772 102,430 107,772 
R2 0.2706 0.2323 0.2734 0.2345 0.2742 0.2366 0.2738 0.2358 
Chow test F-statistic 5.94 5.76 5.82 5.81 
p-value  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Panel C: Failure probability 
Sample split 
Failure probability Failure probability Failure probability Failure probability 
<p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 <p50 ≥p50 
TG -0.0424 0.0110 -0.0411 0.0191 -0.0407 0.0160 -0.0411 0.0147 
 (-0.97) (0.32) (-0.95) (0.52) (-0.94) (0.44) (-0.95) (0.41) 
TG * Post -0.0510 -0.0608* -0.0501 -0.0676* -0.0497 -0.0657** -0.0499 -0.0658** 
 (-1.72) (-2.08) (-1.69) (-2.12) (-1.67) (-2.17) (-1.68) (-2.16) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,590 102,467 102,590 102,467 102,590 102,467 102,590 102,467 
R2 0.1942 0.2419 0.1948 0.2451 0.1949 0.2465 0.1950 0.2463 
Chow test F-statistic  12.43 12.35 11.36 11.44 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel D: Listed and unlisted banks 
Sample split Listed  
banks 
Unlisted 
banks 
Listed  
banks 
Unlisted 
banks 
Listed  
banks 
Unlisted 
banks 
Listed  
banks 
Unlisted 
banks 
TG 0.0124 -0.0082 0.0185 -0.0026 0.0209 -0.0058 0.0190 -0.0063 
 (0.23) (-0.26) (0.34) (-0.07) (0.38) (-0.17) (0.35) (-0.19) 
TG * Post -0.0658** -0.0426* -0.0664** -0.0461** -0.0665** -0.0440* -0.0662** -0.0448* 
 (-2.48) (-1.98) (-2.45) (-2.16) (-2.44) (-2.05) (-2.44) (-2.10) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,268 163,789 41,268 163,789 41,268 163,789 41,268 163,789 
R2 0.2327 0.2315 0.2355 0.2346 0.2365 0.2365 0.2361 0.2359 
Chow test F-statistic  11.68 14.14 14.52 14.48 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panel E: Member banks of BHCs and Non BHC banks 
Sample split BHC 
members 
Non BHC 
banks 
BHC  
members 
Non BHC 
banks 
BHC  
members 
Non BHC 
banks 
BHC  
members 
Non BHC 
banks 
TG -0.0085 0.0092 -0.0026 0.0141 -0.0058 0.0168 -0.0065 0.0154 
 (-0.27) (0.16) (-0.08) (0.25) (-0.17) (0.29) (-0.19) (0.27) 
TG * Post -0.0428* -0.0640** -0.0465** -0.0644** -0.0445* -0.0644** -0.0451* -0.0642** 
 (-2.00) (-2.39) (-2.17) (-2.36) (-2.08) (-2.34) (-2.12) (-2.35) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 137,251 67,806 137,251 67,806 137,251 67,806 137,251 67,806 
R2 0.2316 0.2321 0.2348 0.2347 0.2368 0.2356 0.2362 0.2352 
Chow test F-statistic  4.2 4.65 4.43 4.56 
p-value 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
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Notes:  This table reports estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures 𝐸𝑂1-𝐸𝑂4 as the dependent variable. Panel A 
splits the sample at the median level of bank size. Panel B splits the sample at the median of the ratio of real estate loans to total 
loans. Panel C splits the sample at the median failure probability. Panel D presents results from samples of listed and unlisted 
banks. Panel E reports results from samples of BHC and non BHC member banks. Except for Panel D and E, the sample splits 
use the pre-treatment median values to ensure that they are not affected by depositor preference laws. The control variables are 
LLPt-1, Bank size, Capital ratio, and the Loss dummy. Definitions of the variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The sample 
is restricted to banks in states that enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A:  Details for the introduction of state depositor preference laws  
 
A.1 List of keywords - search strategy for motivation behind state depositor preference laws   
 
The following list of keywords is used in Lexis/Nexis, Factiva, American Banker, Journal State 
Legislatures, and Business Source Complete.  
 
priority for bank deposits, priority for depositors, depositor priority, depositor preference, 
priority claim, creditor ranking, bank liquidation, bank failure, liquidation of bank, claim 
structure for deposits, ranking of depositors, deposit obligation, depositor obligation, claims of 
depositors, claim structure, priority of claims liquidation priority, liquidation regime, claims to 
be paid before those of general creditors, pari passu with general creditors, market discipline, 
enforcement actions, deposit rank, depositor rank, Omnibus Reconciliation Act, earnings 
opacity, opacity, transparency, opaque.   
 
Our keyword search is constrained to the 12 months prior to the day of the introduction of state depositor 
preference. 
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Appendix B:  Additional Results and Robustness Tests  
 
Table B.1 
Charter Switching 
Panel A: Determinants of charter switching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Charter switch  Charter switch  Charter switch  Charter switch  
Post 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 
 (1.62) (1.62) (1.62) (1.62) 
LLP𝑡−1  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Bank size 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) 
Capital ratio 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
 (1.73) (1.73) (1.74) (1.74) 
Loss 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0007* 
 (1.87) (1.88) (1.87) (1.87) 
𝐸𝑂1  0.0000    
 (0.31)    
𝐸𝑂2   0.0000   
  (0.32)   
𝐸𝑂3    0.0000  
   (0.39)  
𝐸𝑂4     0.0000 
    (0.40) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.0401 0.0401 0.0401 0.0401 
Panel B: Excluding banks that switch charter 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG * Post -0.0737*** -0.0764*** -0.0755*** -0.0761*** 
 (-3.79) (-3.86) (-3.89) (-3.92) 
LLP𝑡−1 0.2916*** 0.2489*** 0.2760*** 0.2334*** 
 (6.47) (4.10) (8.71) (6.72) 
Bank size 0.0178 0.0101 0.0058 0.0098 
 (1.06) (0.60) (0.34) (0.59) 
Capital ratio -0.0919*** -0.0931*** -0.0922*** -0.0928*** 
 (-4.33) (-4.39) (-4.25) (-4.33) 
Loss 0.7565*** 0.7576*** 0.7573*** 0.7583*** 
 (24.75) (24.76) (23.86) (24.09) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 197,681 197,681 197,681 197,681 
R2 0.2215 0.2246 0.2263 0.2257 
Notes:  Panel A reports estimates of equation 𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
𝑗
+ 𝛿𝑏 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡, where 𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑡 is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if bank 𝑏 in state 𝑠 switches charter during quarter 𝑡, 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if depositor preference is present in state 𝑠 during quarter 𝑡; 𝑋𝑏𝑠𝑡 is a vector containing the variables LLPt−1, Bank size, 
Capital ratio, the Loss dummy, 𝛿𝑏, 𝛿𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 denote bank-, state- and quarter-fixed effects, respectively; 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡 is the error 
term. 𝐸𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡
𝑗
 denotes one of the earnings opacity measures, 𝐸𝑂1, 𝐸𝑂2, 𝐸𝑂3 and 𝐸𝑂4. Panel B reports estimates of 
equation (6) using a sample that excludes banks that switch charter during the sample period. The TG dummy is omitted 
in this equation because it is captured by the bank-fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and the 
corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
60 
 
 
Online Appendix: Debtholder monitoring incentives and bank earnings opacity 
 
Table B.2 
Failure Model 
 (1) 
Dependent variable  Failure dummy  
Bank size -0.0003 
 (-1.17) 
Capital ratio -0.0002* 
 (-1.92) 
NPA 0.0021 
 (0.60) 
Cost income ratio -0.0001 
 (-1.01) 
Cash 0.0001 
 (1.10) 
State * Quarter FE Yes 
Bank FE Yes  
Observations 205,057 
R2 0.0448 
Notes:  We report estimates of the equation 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡, where 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if bank b in 
state s fails at time t, 0 otherwise; Bank size, Capital ratio, NPA, Cost Income Ratio, and Cash denote bank size, 
the capital ratio, the nonperforming loans ratio, the cost income ratio, and cash for bank b in state s at time t; 𝛾𝑏 
and 𝛾𝑠𝑡 denote bank and state-quarter-fixed effects, respectively; 𝜀𝑏𝑠𝑡 is the error term. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10 percent level. 
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Table B.3 
Further sensitivity checks: Geographical diversification, macroeconomic shocks, and regulators 
Panel A: Geographical diversification  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable  𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG * Post -0.0610*** -0.0644*** -0.0631*** -0.0633*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.50) (-3.51) (-3.51) 
TG * Number of counties -0.0354*** -0.0289** -0.0296* -0.0313** 
 (-3.24) (-2.24) (-2.11) (-2.16) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2218 0.2249 0.2266 0.2261 
Panel B: Macroeconomic shocks  
Dependent variable  𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG * Post -0.0641*** -0.0666*** -0.0654*** -0.0659*** 
 (-3.74) (-3.75) (-3.70) (-3.73) 
TG * UNEMP  0.0071 0.0081 0.0077 0.0077 
 (0.71) (0.86) (0.79) (0.77) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2217 0.2248 0.2265 0.2259 
Panel C: Regulatory agency 
Dependent variable  𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG * Post -0.0642*** -0.0668*** -0.0655*** -0.0660*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.68) (-3.68) (-3.70) 
TG * FDIC  -0.1712* -0.1727* -0.1713* -0.1710* 
 (-2.01) (-1.95) (-1.91) (-1.94) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2217 0.2248 0.2265 0.2259 
Notes:  We report estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures 𝐸𝑂1-𝐸𝑂4 as dependent variables. Panel A 
includes an interaction term between the treatment group dummy and the number of counties a bank operates in. 
Panel B includes an interaction term between the treatment group dummy and the state unemployment rate, and Panel 
C includes an interaction term between the treatment group dummy and an FDIC dummy. The control variables are 
LLPt-1, Bank size, Capital ratio, and the Loss dummy. The sample is restricted to banks in states that enacted 
depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and the 
corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table B.4 
Alternative control group: Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG 0.0105 0.0104 0.0116 0.0120 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
TG * Post -0.1325*** -0.1312*** -0.1317*** -0.1322*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.16) (-4.15) (-4.16) 
LLP𝑡−1   1.3024*** 1.3728*** 1.3709*** 1.3450*** 
 (5.09) (5.33) (5.04) (4.92) 
Bank size -0.0916 -0.1022 -0.1094 -0.1067 
 (-1.41) (-1.56) (-1.66) (-1.63) 
Capital ratio -0.1089*** -0.1084*** -0.1085*** -0.1087*** 
 (-3.81) (-3.80) (-3.78) (-3.80) 
Loss 0.6978*** 0.6943*** 0.6937*** 0.6947*** 
 (20.35) (20.65) (20.72) (20.61) 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 77,269 77,269 77,269 77,269 
R2 0.1828 0.1863 0.1879 0.1874 
Notes:  We report estimates of equation (6) based on a 1:1 nearest neighbor propensity matching strategy using the 
earnings opacity measures 𝐸𝑂1-𝐸𝑂4 as dependent variables. Our matched sample pairs one state-chartered 
bank with one propensity-score matched nationally-chartered bank, resulting in a sample with 77,269 
observations. The sample is restricted to banks in states that enacted depositor preference over the period 
1983Q1 to 1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table B.5 
Tests for anticipation effects and alternative treatment of standard errors 
Panel A: Anticipation effects     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable  𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG -0.0007 0.0030 0.0004 0.0002 
 (-0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
TG * Post -0.0700*** -0.0712*** -0.0692*** -0.0703*** 
 (-3.43) (-3.33) (-3.33) (-3.35) 
TG * Placebot-1 -0.0257 -0.0203 -0.0184 -0.0193 
 (-0.92) (-0.79) (-0.72) (-0.75) 
TG * Placebot-2 0.0165 0.0188 0.0182 0.0157 
 (0.65) (0.79) (0.69) (0.60) 
TG * Placebot-3 -0.0449 -0.0379 -0.0345 -0.0379 
 (-0.82) (-0.69) (-0.63) (-0.69) 
TG * Placebot-4 -0.0121 -0.0115 -0.0079 -0.0088 
 (-0.45) (-0.41) (-0.27) (-0.31) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 205,057 205,057 205,057 205,057 
R2 0.2217 0.2248 0.2265 0.2259 
Panel B: Bertrand et al. (2004) collapsing technique  
Dependent variable  𝐸𝑂1 𝐸𝑂2 𝐸𝑂3 𝐸𝑂4 
TG  -0.0956 -0.0863 -0.0860 -0.0893 
 (-1.47) (-1.33) (-1.32) (-1.38) 
TG * Post -0.0974*** -0.1004*** -0.0995*** -0.0991*** 
 (-6.21) (-6.40) (-6.33) (-6.32) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048 
R2 0.7343 0.7378 0.7407 0.7403 
Notes:  We report estimates of equation (6) using the earnings opacity measures 𝐸𝑂1-𝐸𝑂4 as dependent variables. Panel A 
examines anticipation effects by including placebo dummies at t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4 interacted with the treatment 
group dummy, and Panel B uses the collapsing technique described in Bertrand et al. (2004) to mitigate concerns 
about serial correlation in panels. The data in Panel B contain a before and after period for each bank and we 
therefore generate period dummy variables, interacted with the state-fixed effects to mirror the state*quarter-fixed 
effects. The control variables are LLPt-1, Bank size, Capital ratio, and the Loss dummy. The sample is restricted to 
banks in states that enacted depositor preference over the period 1983Q1 to 1993Q2. Standard errors are clustered at 
the state level, except for Panel B, and the corresponding heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
  
